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Abstract: Perception matters for research and analysis because the image of a state
(non-state actor) as aggressive and the perceptions of its intentions as aggressive
are mutually reinforcing. We will use an interdisciplinary perspective combining
political science and adult education research, which we believe has the potential
for further policy advice.
Introduction
How perceptions can differ! After signing the interim Iranian nuclear pact on November
24th 2013 in Geneva, a historic agreement between Teheran and the P5+1-group2 that freezes key
parts of the Iranian nuclear program in exchange for temporary relief on some economic sanctions,
US President, Barack Obama, praised the agreement. But Israel’s Premier, Benjamin Netanyahu
denounced it as a “historic mistake” that will enable Iran to fulfill its nuclear ambitions (Booth,
2013). As the current Iranian nuclear crisis shows (Bock, 2012, 2013), states as the key players in
security issues3 tend to balance4 against what they (i.e., those in charge of political decisions
(Wendt, 1999, p. 94)) perceive as a threat (Bock & Henneberg, 2013; Stein, 2013). I believe that
perception matters because the image of a state (or a non-state actor) as aggressive and the
perceptions of its intentions as aggressive are mutually reinforcing: the image influences the
perception, and the perception fosters the image (Bock & Henneberg, 2013, pp. 25–28). With
respect to the policy against a perceived threat, it is irrelevant whether the state (or non-state actor)
under suspicion really has aggressive intentions; the deciding factor is how the intentions are
perceived and evaluated. We consider Walt’s (1990) “balance of threat” theory to be a convincing
theory for explaining state behavior. States react to threats, not power. This state-centered
approach is also open to the psychological phenomenon of perception and its effect on decision
making (Robert Jervis, 2010, pp. 1–14). Because the core assumption of security “is about the
pursuit of freedom from threat“ (Buzan, 1991, p. 18 Italics added), research on how states react
to threats addresses both security and peace.
Research Gap: Does Balancing Work?
2

The P5+1 are the six major states which, in 2006, joined diplomatic efforts regard to the Iranian nuclear program.
The term refers to the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany.
3
This does not imply that states are the only actors. There are, of course, other actors as well, but states are in security
questions still the decisive actors; see page 10 for detailed clarification.
4
For the purpose of this research, we define balancing as a state strategy that is 1) designed to counter a perceived
external threat by 2) either military or nonmilitary means that are 3) either internal or external and aim 4) to weaken
a state or alliance perceived as a threat.
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Balancing is an age-old and fundamental concept in international relations and political
science. Despite the long history and use of this concept, “there has been little analysis of what it
means for a state to ‘balance’” (Martin, 1999, p. 1), and despite the extensive literature on
balancing, no systematic empirical research has been done to determine whether balancing can
fulfill its purpose: to reduce the threat and provide security by weakening the threatening state or
alliance. I intend to fill this fundamental research gap. Hence our leading research question: Can
balancing fulfill its purpose and reduce the threat states react to and provide security by
weakening the threatening state or alliance?
The Puzzle: What Makes a Threat a Threat?
But what makes Iran a threat? Is it the anticipated possession of nuclear weapons, as Walt’s
theory suggests (Walt, 1990, pp. 22–26)? Walt distinguishes four different sources that make
states5 a threat (Walt, 1990, pp. 21–26):
 Aggregate power refers to means “a state’s total resources” (Walt, 1990, p. 22); the greater
the aggregate power, the greater the threat a state can pose.
 Geographic proximity refers to the distance that lies between the potential competitors; the
greater the distance, the more limited “the ability to project power” (Walt, 1990, p. 23),
and the more limited the potential threat.
 Offensive power refers to the size of “offensive capabilities” (Walt, 1990, p. 24); the
greater the offensive power, the greater the threat a state can pose. Offensive power is
closely related to aggregate power and geographic proximity.
 Aggressive intentions refer to how states perceive a potential enemy (Walt, 1990, pp. 25–
26).
We hold this explanation for not decisive. For example, during the Cold War, the nuclear weapons
of the US, the UK, and France were not threatening to Germany despite the tremendous supremacy
of the US alone in terms of aggregate and offensive power (given the vast amount of
intercontinental ballistic missiles, the remoteness between the US and Germany was of little
importance). The image Germany had/has of the US as well as the UK and France was, and still
is, decisive: Germans neither perceive the US as aggressive nor as hostile. They are therefore not
a threat (Robert Jervis, 1985, p. 14). An analogous example is the US-led Kosovo war. Russia and
China balanced against the US and tried to form a Russian-Chinese-Indian alliance – which
ultimately failed to materialize because “the principal powers began to perceive the likelihood of
potential American military intervention […] as extremely low” (Paul, 2005, p. 63). The
perception of the US as non-threatening was crucial for Russia and China. So, it’s not the weapons
alone that are threatening. We assume that it is not the availability of weapons but rather the intent
that constitutes a threat: the aggressive intentions the US and Israel believes the regime in Teheran
has, make the prospect of Iranian nuclear weapons threatening. Therefore, the first hypothesis can
be formulated as follows: The perception of a state’s intentions as aggressive is decisive for that
state being (perceived as) a threat.
Why Perception Matters
5

We do not believe that only states can be threatened to states; (national and transnational) terrorism set a very good
example that non-state actors can also be perceived as a threat. However, we believe and fully agree with Walt’s
theoretical assumption that the image a state, i.e., the persons in charge with the political decisions has of the nonstate actor is decisive in how this actor is perceived and evaluated. Exactly for that reason, a non-state actor (e.g.,
Hezbollah) is perceived by Israel as a threat but not by Iran or Palestine.
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At this point, one may wonder why balancing a state perceived as a threat would be
counterproductive. The Cuban Missile Crisis, which I believe is symptomatic of a fundamental
security policy problem, is a textbook example. The reason for Nikita Khrushchev's decision to
station nuclear missiles in Cuba can be described as an effort to balance (Bock, 2013, pp. 77–91).
John F. Kennedy’s motivation for the US policy concerning both post-Batista Cuba and the Soviet
Union can equally be described as balancing. Khrushchev and Kennedy’s efforts to balance against
the threats perceived from the opposing side led the world to the brink of nuclear war (Lebow &
Stein, 1994, p. 5). The problem here was that any action that the US or the Soviet Union took in
order to increase its particular security was perceived by the other as a reinforcement of the threat
and only caused countermeasures that were more rigorous. This made the security situation even
more precarious for both sides.
Herz described a mutually reinforcing process as a security dilemma (Herz, 1950, p. 157).
This dilemma is highly dependent on the perceived intentions of the potential adversary. As Jervis
states: “The decision maker who thinks that the other
side is probably hostile will see ambiguous
information as confirming this image, whereas the
same information about a country thought to be
friendly would be taken more benignly.” (Robert
Jervis, 1985, p. 18). In other words, the same
information can lead to rather different assessments
and evaluations. Self-perception and external
perception may also fundamentally differ. As former US Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles
stated, “Khrushchev does not need to be convinced of our good intentions. He knows we are not
aggressors and do not threaten the security of the Soviet Union” (quoted in R. Jervis, 1976, p. 68).
Unfortunately, the opposite was true: Khrushchev felt threatened by the US, which led to his
decision to station nuclear missiles in Cuba.
An explanation for this “perception problem” is offered by Richards J. Heuer, who
describes perception as “an active rather than a passive process; it constructs rather than records
‘reality’” (Heuer, 1999, p. 7). This process, in which people construct their own version of reality
is “strongly influenced by their past experience, education, cultural values, and role requirements
[…]” (Heuer, 1999, p. 7).
Figure 1 is a simple example to demonstrate the influence of experience and expectations
on our perceptions. Looking at the three phrases, what did you read? In each of the phrases, the
article is written twice. That is commonly overlooked because perception is influenced by our
experience and our expectations about how
these phrases are grammatically correctly
written. This example demonstrates one of
the most fundamental principles concerning
perception: “We tend to perceive what we
Figure 1: Heuer (1998, 8)
expect to perceive.” (Heuer 1999, 8). And
this means that threats are not given but
socially constructed – against the
background of the experiences states made.
Because, as Alexander Wendt puts it:
“[s]tates are people too” (Wendt 1999, 94).
In the case of the perception of a threatening
Figure 2 (own graphic)
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Iran there is a whole bunch of experience with negative connotations made both by the US and
Israel. Here we see Jervis’ observation from his Perception and Misperception in International
Politics confirmed: “So we find that decision-makers […] worry about the most implausible
threats.” (R. Jervis, 1976, p. 62) With respect to policy against a perceived threat, it is therefore
irrelevant whether the state (or alliance) under suspicion really plans to attack the US (as the
Kennedy administration wrongly perceived during the Cuban Missile Crisis) or merely wants to
satisfy a need for security.
The crisis over the Iranian nuclear program illustrates how this dynamic process can work
in international politics (Bock & Henneberg, 2013, pp. 25–28). The key arguments are (see Figure
2): State A6 (e.g., Iran) implements a policy P (buying clandestine uranium centrifuges). The way
state B (in our case: the US and Israel) reacts depends largely (if not exclusively) on how the
intentions underlying policy P are perceived i.e., the intentions that state A (here: Iran) is assumed
to have. The perception of the intentions underlying policy P is strongly influenced (not to mention
determined) by a preexisting image: Iran is aggressive, anti-Semitic, and anti-Israeli. The image
of a state as aggressive and the perception of its intentions as aggressive are mutually reinforcing:
the image of Iran as being aggressive, anti-Semitic, and anti-Israeli influences the perception of
policy P as being aggressive; the perception of policy P as being aggressive conversely fosters the
image of Iran as being aggressive, anti-Semitic, and anti-Israeli. Balancing the perceived Iranian
threat tends to backfire. Balancing aims to weaken Iran, but to weaken Iran means to threaten it.
This entails convincing the leaders in Teheran that a nuclear-weapons program is a necessary
means of deterrence and self-defense (Bock, 2012, 2013). This means: The image of a state (or a
non-state actor such as Hezbollah) as aggressive and the perception of its intentions as aggressive
are mutually reinforcing: the image influences the perception, and the perception fosters the image.
Consequently, the second hypothesis can be formulated as follows: Balancing exacerbates the
dynamic of the security dilemma and thereby reinforces the perceived threat of the balancing
state(s).
Outlook
Provided our hypotheses are valid, an alternative approach to reacting to threats is required.
There is actually no established alternative to balancing in the repertoire of reactions to external
threat. This clear lack of analysis inhibits an appropriate foreign policy strategy and affects the
security and policy options of modern states.
As the Iranian example indicates, it is contestable how a threat can be overcome. Critical
(self) reflection is required to realize a change in perspective, which helps to overcome the
“perception problem”. This entails reflection on the content (What makes Iran a threat?), the
process (How becomes Iran a threat?), and the premise (Why is Iran a threat?). Here, we believe
Jack Mezirow’s (1978, 1991) Transformative Learning Theory comes into play, given that offers
an explanation for the processes of how our reality is constructed in response to our frames of
reference or meaning perspectives – as the structure of assumptions and expectations through
which our impressions are filtered (1994; Mezirow, 1978, 1991). In this cyclic process,
perspectives also result from how we interpret our experience, either within or outside our
awareness.
To cope with threats we believe that it’s necessary to understand the making of meaning as an
open learning process, which means to transform our taken-for-granted perspectives, described by
6

You may also replace state for a non-state actor like Hezbollah. The argument remains the same. Here, I use state to
illustrate the dynamic of the Iran nuclear crisis.
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Mezirow: “Transformative learning refers to the process by which we transform our taken-forgranted frames of reference (meaning perspectives, habits of mind, mind-sets) to make them more
inclusive, discriminating, open, emotionally capable of change, and reflective so that they may
generate beliefs and opinions that will prove more true or justified to guide action.” (Mezirow,
2012, p. 76). This applies directly to the Iran crisis as there are a lot of not-transformed taken-forgranted frames of references – unreflective stereotypes about hostile Iranians with suicidal
tendencies.
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